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Technology, Competition, and Values 
Frank Pasquale* 
Toward the end of his study Diffusion of Innovations, 
Everett Rodgers surveys the distributive effects of new 
technologies.1  He concludes that new technologies tend to 
increase the gap between haves and have-nots, as the wealthy 
and powerful gain advantages over those unable to afford 
technologies or products.  Rodgers’ study focuses on what is 
usually thought of as the cure for this process: the diffusion of 
innovation across society.  However, Rodgers notes that due to 
the “windfall profits” often available to early adopters of 
technology, even the “diffusion of innovations usually decreases 
the degree of equality in a social system.”2 
Law can advance or retard the distributive effects of 
innovation and its diffusion in many ways.  Certain 
technologies merit special monitoring because they promote the 
leveraging of economic advantage into social or cultural 
advantage without substantially increasing overall social 
welfare.3  Others threaten to undermine collective values and 
perceptions commonly used to evaluate technology.4  A final 
                                                          
©  2007 Frank Pasquale. 
*   Professor Pasquale  joined Seton Hall after practicing law as an attorney at 
Arnold & Porter LLP, where his work included antitrust and intellectual 
property litigation. Professor Pasquale's prior experience includes clerking for 
the Honorable Judge Kermit Lipez of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit and serving as a fellow at the Institute for the Defense of 
Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property in Lima, Peru.  
 1. EVERETT ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 429-34 (4th ed. 1995). 
 2. Id. at 430. 
 3. See, e.g., Posting of Frank Pasquale to PrawfsBlawg, How Opal Got 
Ahead, available at 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2006/05/how_opal_got_ah.html 
(May 9, 2006, 18:40 EST) (discussing the role of consulting services in creating 
position-enhancing information for application to elite colleges).  I refer to 
such innovation as primarily re-allocative, rather than primarily generative, of 
social welfare. 
 4. See, e.g., Posting of Frank Pasquale to Law and Technology Theory, 
Two Relationships Between Law and Technology, 
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category threatens to do both, creating unfair or wasteful 
competition while blunting our capacity to recognize its morally 
dubious character. 
The law’s current emphasis on innovation is 
understandable to the extent that it improves social welfare.  
However, much technology is used not just simply to improve 
its user’s life, but also to help its user gain advantage over 
others.  Expensive sport utility vehicles (SUVs) have provoked 
a “highway arms race,”5 since the “extra weight of SUVs 
rearranges where deaths occur in crashes, transferring deaths 
from the SUVs to the cars.”6  The net neutrality debate may be 
framed in similar, if less macabre, zero-sum terms: whose 
content gets where faster and at what cost?7  Tollbooths on the 
internet, which are designed to bring information from certain 
websites to users more quickly than from other websites, 
illustrate one answer to this question.8 
                                                          
http://techtheory.blogspot.com/2006/12/two-relationships-between-
technology.html (Dec. 6, 2006, 9:04 EST) (“To bioethicists like Carl Elliott, 
using drugs to alleviate mild alienation may lead to self-betrayal, since 
intuitions about the worth or worthlessness of forms of life around us are 
constitutive of our identity.”). 
 5. See Michelle J. White, The “Arms Race” on American Roads: The 
Effect of Sport Utility Vehicles and Pickup Trucks on Traffic Safety, 47 J.L. & 
ECON. 333, 333 (2004) (discussing the highway arms race). 
 6. KEITH BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY: THE DANGEROUS RISE OF THE 
SUV 170 (Public Affairs 2003).  Regulators estimate SUVs cause 2000 extra 
deaths a year.  Id. at 169.  However, they contribute little or nothing to the 
safety of their occupants and greatly increase the danger of driving for non-
SUV drivers.  Id. at xv.  Gregg Easterbrook describes some additional 
problems:  
These vehicles have converted driving . . . into a nerve-wracking 
Darwinian battle. . . . [They] are designed to bring out the worst in 
their owners while simultaneously making them feel that they are 
invincible. . . . Traffic studies show that the typical SUV occupies as 
much road and parking space as 1.4 regular cars. 
Gregg Easterbrook, Axle of Evil, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 20, 2003, at 27-28, 
available at 
http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030120&s=easterbrook012003; see also  
Posting of Frank Pasquale to Jurisdynamics, SUVs, Ethanol and Distributive 
Justice, http://jurisdynamics.blogspot.com/2006/10/suvs-ethanol-and-
distributive-justice.html (Oct. 9, 2006, 14:24). 
 7. Posting of Frank Pasquale to Concurring Opinions, Net Neutrality: 
Law, Money, and Culture, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/10/net_neutrality.html (Oct. 
18, 2006, 15:58) (discussing the competitive dynamics that could be unleashed 
if access guarantees and broadband speed were commodified in certain ways). 
 8. Editorial, Tollbooths on the Internet Highway, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 
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At one point in time, we could perhaps count on a common, 
technologically unmediated response to these dilemmas. But 
mind-focused technological interventions such as therapeutic 
forgetting,9 some forms of cosmetic psychopharmacology,10 and 
new attention-enhancement drugs11 may diminish our store of 
collective values and common perceptions.12  They may promote 
competition in the new technological arms races, rather than 
social questioning of their fairness or the premises of new 
technologies.13  This process can raise deep problems for 
theorists, for it heralds the technological undermining of the 
very values upon which we rely to judge technology. 
In this short piece I cannot propose solutions to the 
growing problem of technological arms races and the 
technological blunting of qualms about them.  However, I can 
outline some of the dilemmas these developments create, and 
suggest direction for some policy responses.  As new sectors of 
life become more game-like and competitive, methods of 
leveling the playing field developed in sports and college 
admissions might become more broadly relevant.14  Inequality 
impact statements may be as important to our cultural 
                                                          
2006, at A14. 
 9. See generally Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and 
Ethical Implications of Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561 (2006). 
 10. See generally Ashley Pettus, Psychiatry by Prescription, HARV. MAG., 
July-Aug. 2006, at 38 (discussing whether those who are receiving prescription 
drugs for mental health issues need them in all cases). 
 11. David Plotz, Wake up Little Susie: Can We Sleep Less?, SLATE, Mar. 7, 
2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2079113. 
 12. See Kolber, supra note 9, at 1613-22. 
 13. The analysis here might be deemed part of the school identified as 
“managed technological skepticism” in a recent report on cognitive 
enhancement.  See CONSORTIUM FOR SCI., POLICY & OUTCOMES AT ARIZ. 
STATE UNIV. AND ADVANCED CONCEPTS GROUP, SANDIA NAT’L LABS., POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT (2006), 
available at 
http://www.cspo.org/documents/FinalEnhancedCognitionReport.pdf 
(“According to [the] standpoint [of Managed technological skepticism], quality 
of life arises more out of a society’s institutions than its technologies. Markets 
are viewed as profit-maximizing, not quality-of-life maximizing. The role of 
government is to enable the more effective pursuit of social goals such as 
equity and justice, rather than to promote technological advance as a proxy for 
such goals.”). 
 14. See, e.g., ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER & JUDITH LICHTENBERG, LEVELING 
THE PLAYING FIELD: JUSTICE, POLITICS AND COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 205-215 
(2004) (summarizing their arguments of how to reform college admissions).  
See generally PAUL C. WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: HOW THE LAW 
CAN MAKE SPORTS BETTER FOR FANS (2000). 
PASQUALE FINALTOPRINT.DOC 6/15/2007  3:08:02 PM 
610 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 8:2 
 
 
environment as environmental impact statements are to the 
natural world.  Finally, current laws regulating the use of 
controlled substances may need to be extended to precision 
chemical-based emotional enhancement, even if such 
pharmaceutical interventions are non-addictive.  Technology 
should not be allowed to accelerate wasteful or unfair arms 
races or to undermine the very values we rely upon to evaluate 
it. 
I. THE COMMODIFICATION OF ADVANTAGE 
The relationship between technology and equality is 
complex. Two narratives now dominate, and two counter-
narratives need a better hearing.  The first dominant narrative 
is that a rising technological tide lifts all boats and leads to a 
convergence of living standards.  Adam Smith tended to explain 
a convergence of living conditions as epiphenomenal of nobles’ 
desire for expensive baubles: “the expensive vanity of the 
landlord made him willing to accept” gradual cession of power 
over individual lives in exchange for the accumulation of 
durable goods.15  Contemporary social commentators tend to 
emphasize the enormous gains in living standards of even the 
poorest Americans due to technological advance.16 
Some current technological developments validate their 
faith in technology’s power to democratize power and bring 
convergence in living standards. For example, critics of 
oligopolistic control of the United States’ music market might 
frame the rise of file-sharing technology as a deeply egalitarian 
development.17  Anyone with an Internet connection can 
download content long locked up by an industry only recently 
stirred to address pricing concerns.18  Internet access to 
                                                          
 15. Nathan Rosenberg, Adam Smith, Consumer Tastes, and Economic 
Growth, 76 J. POL. ECON. 361, 370 (1968) (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 390 (Random House 1937) (1776)). 
 16. See, e.g., GREGG EASTERBROOK, THE PROGRESS PARADOX (2004) 
(emphasizing the objective improvement of living standards even during 
periods when subjective accounts of well-being appeared to stagnate or 
decline). 
 17. See Matthew Fagin et al., Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to 
Advance and Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
451, 457-58 (2002). 
 18. See, e.g., Posting of Mike to Techdirt, Universal Pictures Tries to Beat 
Counterfeiters at Their Own Game In Russia,  
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20060407/174244.shtml (Apr. 7, 2006, 18:35 
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information in general is an equalizing development; anyone 
can access a trove of medical studies previously available only 
to professionals.19 
Yet new technologies can harden social stratification and 
prompt arms races that merely reallocate (rather than produce 
new) goods and services.  Each of the technological examples 
given above has a mirror image that undermines its initial 
emancipatory promise.  From the Secure Digital Music 
Initiative20 to vertical integration of content and devices, 
virtually every new technology of “info-anarchy” has been 
matched by a technique of perfect control, though often at the 
cost of crippled and unpopular products.21  Market producers 
will have very promising competitive strategies at their 
disposal when they see social producers threatening their 
revenue streams.22  New anti-circumvention technology is a key 
part of that strategy.23 Without a fair-use infrastructure for 
digital rights management24 and pricing systems that take 
                                                          
EST); see also Randall Stross, Want an iPhone? Beware the iHandcuffs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, § 3, at 3; Posting of John Bennett to Against Monopoly, 
http://www.againstmonopoly.org/index.php?limit=10&chunk=1&topic=IP+in+t
he+News (Jan. 16, 2007, 07:14 EST) (discussing digital restrictions 
management and how it changed in South Korea “only after CD sales 
collapsed.”); Posting of Ketola to Afterdawn.com, Too Expensive DVDs? Stop 
Buying Them!, http://www.afterdawn.com/news/archive/4117.cfm (May 29, 
2003, 16:32 EST) (discussing the Malaysian government’s response to DVD 
pricing). 
 19. Amanda Schaffer, Open Access: Should Scientific Articles Be Available 
Online and Free to the Public?, SLATE, Dec. 14, 2004, 
http://slate.msn.com/id/2111023; Rick Weiss, A Fight for Free Access to 
Medical Research Online Plan Challenges Publishers’ Dominance, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 5, 2003, at A1. 
 20. Secure Digital Music Initiative Homepage, http://www.sdmi.org/ (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2007). 
 21. Posting of Tim Armstrong to Info/Law, Zune Stinks? Blame Grokster, 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2006/11/26/ 
zune-stinks-blame-grokster/ (Nov. 26, 2006, 10:49); see also Stross, supra note 
18. 
 22. Lior Strahilevitz, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at §§ IIA-IIC, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=946479) (reviewing YOCHAI BENKLER, THE 
WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS 
AND FREEDOM (2006)).  Benkler’s book discusses how technology makes it 
easier for individuals not motivated by profit (deemed “social producers”) to 
complete projects once only motivated by the profit motive (done by “market 
producers”).  Strahilevitz predicts that market producers will find incentives 
to draw social producers back to market settings.  Id. 
 23. See Stross, supra note 18. 
 24. Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Copyright 
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ability to pay seriously, the vast majority of consumers could 
lose out in the ensuing battle between oligopolists and 
hackers.25 
A similar tension is evident in the rise of technological 
arms races that appear to harden existing market-based 
hierarchies.  Google and Amazon developed search technologies 
that created fantastic clearinghouses of information.  Some 
claim the resulting comprehensive databases have given a 
variety of small players a chance at reaching consumers.26  
Rather than battling for shelf space in retail stores, rarely 
purchased books, music, or films can be kept in a near-infinite 
online inventory until they are accessed. 
Yet the same dynamics that tilted the real-space playing 
field toward dominant players can also infiltrate these new 
online retailers.  We have little idea of how pervasively “stealth 
marketing” affects results on Amazon’s front page, personalized 
recommendations, or other search results.27  New battles for 
prominence in search results could lead old powerhouses to 
dominate this new battlefield.28  Key advertising words are 
already being auctioned, and even unpaid or organic search 
results could become determined by who bids the most for 
search engine optimization technology.29 Search engines 
                                                          
Management Systems 12-22 (Georgetown University Law Center 2000 
Working Paper Series in Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 
23973, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=239731. 
 25. See, e.g., David Needle, Security Vendors Debate the Arms Race, 
EARTHWEBNEWS, May 3, 2007, available at 
http://news.earthweb.com/security/article.php/3675546 (“With the rise in 
attacks, from malware and phishing to assorted viruses and identity theft, it’s 
no wonder the market for security software and services is booming.”). 
 26. CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS 
SELLING LESS OF MORE (2006). 
 27. Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. 
L. REV. 83, 89 (2006) (citing Letter from Heather Hippsley, Acting Assoc. Dir. 
of Adver. Practices, FTC, to Gary Ruskin, Executive Dir., Commercial Alert 
(June 27, 2002), available at 
http://www.commercialalert.org/PDFs/ftcresponse.pdf).  But see Eric Goldman, 
Stealth Risks of Regulating Marketing, 85 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 11, 12-15 
(2006), http://www.texaslrev.com/seealso/volume-85/issue-1/stealth-risks-of-
stealth-marketing.html. 
 28. See Goodman, supra note 27, at 100-103. 
 29. Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115, 123-24 (2006); Kevin Lee, The Search Tax: Are Search 
Engines Leeches?, CLICKZ, Jan. 26, 2007, 
http://clickz.com/showPage.html?page=clickz_print&id=3624697; see also 
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themselves create great social welfare.30  Yet, much of the 
onslaught of follow-on technology for manipulating results 
seems designed primarily to channel that welfare to those best 
able to bid for it.31 
II. LIMITS OF THE INCENTIVES V. ACCESS TRADE-OFF 
When IP-intensive technology leads to inequality, or when 
inequality prevents equal access to technology, it is often 
justified by what I’ll call the second dominant narrative of 
technology and equality: that we must restrict access to 
intellectual property now to create incentives for its future 
creation.32  This debate over the incentives versus access meme 
is so dominant in the IP literature that scholars rarely focus on 
a darker counternarrative: namely, that sometimes access 
restrictions appear to be less about creating incentives for 
future innovation than they are about preserving relative 
advantage.  Consider this account of price discrimination in 
railways: 
It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be 
spent to put a roof over the third-class carriages or to upholster the 
third-class seats that some company or other has open carriages with 
wooden benches. . . . What the company is trying to do is to prevent 
the passengers who can pay the second-class fare from travelling 
third class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to 
frighten the rich . . . . And it is again for the same reason that the 
companies, having proved almost cruel to third-class passengers and 
mean to the second-class ones, become lavish in dealing with first-
class passengers. Having refused the poor what is necessary, they 
give the rich what is superfluous.33 
                                                          
Frank Pasquale, The Law and Economics of Information Overload 
Externalities, VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at § IVA) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=888410. 
 30. See e.g., Weiss, supra note 19. 
 31. See e.g., Pasquale, supra note 29, at 123-24. 
 32. Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s Embrace of 
Intellectual Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965083#PaperDownload 
(last visited May 10, 2007) (“The principal economic justification for 
intellectual property derives from a broader economic problem: the inability of 
a competitive market to support an efficient level of innovation in some areas 
of technological innovation—particularly those in which research and 
development (R&D) is costly, innovation is easily perceived, and imitation is 
relatively inexpensive and can occur rapidly. . . . Most firms would not invest 
in developing new technologies if rivals could enter the market and dissipate 
the profit before R&D costs adjusted for attendant risks could be recovered.”). 
 33. JULES DUPUIT, ON TOLLS AND TRANSPORT CHARGES 23 (International 
Economic Papers No. 11, Elizabeth Henderson trans., 1962), quoted in James 
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In other words, it is in the company’s interests to prevent 
the diffusion of technologies of comfort and repose.  It profits 
from a scramble for better accommodations. 
This may seem like a rather exceptional situation, but 
society is full of examples of positional goods, where the 
problem may be even more acute.34  For example, consider the 
possible development of a height-enhancing pill.35  Society does 
not have much interest in a general boost in height, but many 
individuals do have a personal interest in being taller. Their 
interest is only in their position relative to others, not in 
achieving some platonic ideal of height.  If such a pill were 
developed, it would not change the distribution of height in 
society in a productive way, but it would permit the wealthy to 
escape the stigma of being in the lowest height percentiles.  
That process reinforces the stigma (or at least practical 
difficulty) of being at the very bottom, as extraordinary 
shortness becomes a badge not merely of genetic misfortune, 
but also of financial deficiency.  We could imagine similar 
dynamics developing in the case of other cosmetic 
interventions.36  Indeed, as Sered and Fernandopulle argue in 
                                                          
Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and 
Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2007 (2000).  Cf. 
BARBARA EHRENREICH, FEAR OF FALLING: THE INNER LIFE OF THE AMERICAN 
MIDDLE CLASS 251-63 (1989) (arguing for a revival of conscience and 
responsibility in the middle class and a rediscovery of the lower class). 
 34. See Posting of Frank Pasquale to madisonian.net, A Sketch of My 
Paper on Primarily Position-Enhancing Information, 
http://madisonian.net/archives/2006/10/07/a-sketch-of-my-paper-on-ppei/ (Oct. 
7, 2006) (defining and discussing positional goods); see also Harry Brighouse & 
Adam Swift, Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods, 116 ETHICS 471 (2006) 
(“[Positional goods] are goods with the property that one’s relative place in the 
distribution of the good affects one’s absolute position with respect to its value. 
The very fact that one is worse off than others with respect to a positional good 
means that one is worse off, in some respect, than one would be if that good 
were distributed equally. So while it might indeed be perverse to advocate 
leveling down all things considered, leveling down with respect to positional 
goods benefits absolutely, in some respect, those who would otherwise have 
less than others.”); Robert H. Frank, Positional Externalities Cause Large and 
Preventable Welfare Losses, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 137, 137 (2005). 
 35. See Dov Fox, Human Growth Hormone and the Measure of Man, THE 
NEW ATLANTIS, Fall 2004/Winter 2005, at 75, available at 
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/7/fox.htm. 
 36. See Posting of Frank Pasquale to PrawfsBlawg, The Commodification 
of Caste, 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2006/05/the_commodifica.html 
(May 14, 2006, 07:38 EST). 
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The Uninsured in America, 
The current American system in which health care is linked to 
employment is creating a caste of the chronically ill, infirm, and 
marginally employed. . . . Sick, lacking reliable health care, and 
locked in employment situations . . . that do not offer medical 
benefits, they find it increasingly difficult to escape. . . . Illness itself 
constitutes a physical marker: rotten teeth, chronic coughs, bad skin, 
a limp, . . . – all of these signal caste in basic ways.37 
Thus, ill health is not simply the result of a poor 
employment situation, but also often its cause.  Many 
employers who offer health insurance will examine applicants’ 
physical markers indicating lack of health and dental care in 
the past, and refuse to hire applicants based on unfair 
presumptions about these markers.38  When badges of caste 
become commodified, we have to start thinking about legal 
intervention to stop self-reinforcing stratification. 
New educational technologies can lead to similar dynamics. 
Academic doping has become a real problem on many 
campuses, where students without Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) use Ritalin, Strattera, or other 
pharmaceuticals used to treat ADHD to get an “edge.”39  Those 
wary of caffeine-generated jitters may soon start using ProVigil 
to purchase consequence-free all-nighters.40  Test-preparation 
technologies are also creating inequalities; students able to 
afford test-preparation courses, such as those offered by 
Kaplan, have a definite advantage over those who do not have 
access to such courses.41  The former have the benefit of the 
                                                          
 37. SUSAN STARR SERED & RUSHIKA FERNANDOPULLE, UNINSURED IN 
AMERICA: LIFE AND DEATH IN THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY (2005). 
 38. Id. at 15 (“Because health care is so tightly linked to employment, 
once an inclividual or a family is caught in the death spiral, it is nearly 
impossible to find a way out.  Unemployable or marginally employed because 
of poor health, members of this new “untouchable caste” are denied consistent 
access to medical care.  Sick, lacking reliable health care, and locked in 
employment situations (especially in the service sector—the same sector to 
which India’s untouchables ere consigned) that do not offer medical benefits, 
they find it increasingly difficult to escape.”). 
 39. LAWRENCE H. DILLER, RUNNING ON RITALIN 63 (1998); FRANCIS 
FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
BITECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION (2002); James Butcher, Cognitive Enhancement 
Raises Ethical Concerns, 362(9378) LANCET, 132-133 (2003); Lawrence Diller, 
The Run on Ritalin: Attention Deficit Disorder and Simulant Treatment in the 
1990s, HASTING CENTER REPORT 26 (1996);  Danielle C. Turner & Barbara J. 
Sahakian, Neuroethics of Cognitive Enhancement, 1 BIOSOCIETIES 113 (2006). 
 40. GREG CRITSER, GENERATION RX: HOW PRESCRIPTION DRUGS ARE 
ALTERING AMERICAN LIVES, MINDS, AND BODIES (2005). 
 41. NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE 
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collective insights of hundreds of test takers who report back on 
small portions of the test to central headquarters.42 
Perhaps most discouragingly, efforts to regulate such 
advantages have failed entirely in at least one context.  After 
the South Korean parliament banned “cram schools” in the 
early 1990s due to their inequality-enhancing effect, that 
country’s Supreme Court intervened to declare this tutoring a 
constitutional right.43  Part of the court’s reasoning focused on 
global competitiveness; it assumed that any country that 
unilaterally decided to limit these forms of educational 
competition would effectively “shoot itself in the foot” in the 
global race for capital investment.44 
Admittedly, egalitarian programs have to be conditioned by 
awareness of the multiple levels of competition (both 
temporally and spatially) of which any given competition is 
part.45  For example, in South Korea, an attempt to level the 
playing field within the country, at a particular time, was 
deemed by its Supreme Court to be naïve, given its effects on 
long-term competition by South Koreans in the global economy.  
Therefore, my contention here is not that the law should cripple 
the development of these new technologies; most have many 
                                                          
AMERICAN MERITOCRACY (1999); Malcolm Gladwell, What Stanley Kaplan 
Taught Us About the SAT, NEW YORKER, Dec. 17, 2001, at 86, available at 
http://www.gladwell.com/2001/2001_12_17_a_kaplan.htm. 
 42. LEMANN, supra note 41. 
 43. Extracurricular lesson ban case, 12-1 KCCR 427, 98Hun-Ka16, 
98Hun-Ma429 (consolidated) (April 27, 2000), English translation in 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, DECISIONS OF THE KOREAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (2000) 1, 3 (2002), available at 
http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/download/decision_2001.pdf (“The 
regulation of private education in Article 3 goes beyond the private dimension 
of substantially infringing on the basic rights of parents and children in 
private education . . . .  There is a question as [to] the effectiveness of Article 3 
in the accomplishment of the legislative purpose, [on the] one hand, and 
Article 3 produces substantial restrictive impact on basic rights and 
substantial disadvantages in the accomplishment of a cultural state, on the 
other. Therefore, Article 3 departs widely from a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the public interest obtained through the restriction 
and the restrictive impact caused by the restriction, and therefore violates the 
balance of interests.”) 
 44. Id. (“Cultural poverty in this age of unlimited competition among 
states for survival will ultimately lead to social and economic backwardness.”). 
 45. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE (2002) (discussing 
perils of unilateral decisions to “disarm” in any particular technological 
context). 
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constructive uses.  Rather, it is to argue that inequality-
enhancement should be a quality of technology salient enough 
to lead to some systematic evaluation of its effects.  We see a 
generalized solicitude for the environment in statutes like the 
United States’ NEPA.46  As any American administrative law 
professor can attest, there are many “impact statements” that 
agencies must fill out to assess the effects of their actions on 
small businesses, paperwork, and so on.47  Perhaps the law 
should require similar analysis and disclosure of new 
technological impact on inequality. 
III. AGAINST COMPLACENT CONTINUUMISM 
Technophiles and transhumanists are sure to challenge 
any suggestion of forced disclosure.  One of the primary 
rhetorical tropes of opponents of regulation is to put all manner 
of social change on a continuum and say “See, we’ve been doing 
X for years, this new technology just lets us do it more quickly.”  
                                                          
 46. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000).  
Moreover, certain agencies have to figure out how some new technologies will 
affect the environment. See, e.g., Nanotechnology Law, When Nano Turns 
Washing Machine Into Pesticide, 
http://nanotechlaw.blogspot.com/2006/12/when-nano-turns-washing-machine-
into.html (Dec. 10, 2006, 07:38 EST) (discussing silver-based nanotechnology 
in the Samsung C1235A washing machine, which EPA decided to regulate as a 
pesticide). 
 47. See Daniel A. Farber, Bringing Environmental Assessment into the 
Digital Age (UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 877625, 2006), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=877625.  But see Mark Seidenfeld, A 
Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 533, 533-34 (arguing that too many informational requirements have 
been imposted on the regulatory process).  Seidenfeld catalogs the waves of 
informational requirements; inequality impact statements could fit into any of 
the following: 
The early 1970s, an era that introduced statutorily mandated review 
of agency action to ensure adequate assessment of environmental 
impacts, together with judicial demands for adequately reasoned 
decisions, began a transformation of the notice and comment process 
into one requiring extensive documentation of the information on 
which the agency relies and detailed explanation of the choices the 
agency made in deciding to adopt a rule.  The late 1970s through the 
1980s marked the White House’s commencement of its own demands 
for rigorous regulatory impact analyses—potentially mammoth 
studies that attempt not only to identify but also to quantify the costs 
and benefits of a rule. Not to be outdone, Congress increased the 
statutory demands on agencies’ promulgation of rules, requiring 
analyses of impacts on such entities as small businesses and state, 
local and tribal governments.  And the President continues to impose 
yet additional considerations by executive orders. 
Id. 
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For example, genetic engineering is framed as just a faster 
version of selective breeding (in the agricultural context) or 
assortative mating (in the human context).48 Cognitive 
enhancement is viewed as a more efficient version of education: 
“Much of what we learn in school is ‘mental software’ for 
managing various cognitive domains: mathematics, categories 
of concepts, language, and problem solving in particular 
subjects.”49  Along these lines, one might claim that the 
equality-eroding effects of the aforementioned technologies are 
trivial in comparison with social sources of inequality. We can 
deem this line of thought “complacent continuumism” (CC).  On 
the CC view, technology is just one more way of accomplishing 
ends that would once have been attained via slower or less 
efficient cultural or social methods. 
However, the CC view is based on analogies that fall apart 
under scrutiny.  Technology is often far more sudden, effective, 
and commodifiable than social or cultural methods of 
accomplishing ends. In the case of cognitive enhancement, 
many educational institutions have made a point of assuring 
some kind of equality of access.50  Have we any guarantees that 
“smart pills” would come with similar assurances?  Moreover, 
educational gains in ability come very slowly in comparison 
with potential chemical interventions.  There are more 
opportunities to regulate, more “pressure points,” and more 
cultural traditions of access, in the case of educational 
institutions, than in the case of their potential chemical or 
genetic enhancers. 
Indeed, any hope of an egalitarian program depends on 
some coherent and durable store of human values capable of 
guiding our regulation of technology.  However, self-
manipulation via technology may itself affect those values.51  
                                                          
 48. Assortative mating refers to the tendency of individuals to marry 
other individuals of a similar socioeconomic status and IQ.  See MICKEY KAUS, 
THE END OF EQUALITY (1992); Kate Zernike, Why Are There So Many Single 
Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007, § 4, at 1. 
 49. Nick Bostrom & Anders Sandberg, Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, 
Ethics, Regulatory Challenges, SCI. AND ENGINEERING ETHICS (forthcoming 
2007) (manuscript at 3), available at 
http://www.nickbostrom.com/cognitive.pdf. 
 50. See FULLINWIDER & LICHTENBERG, supra note 14 (on higher 
education); Karen W. Arenson, Harvard Extends Breaks for Low-Income 
Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Mar, 31, 2006, at A10. 
 51. Admittedly, technology can give us a better understanding of the 
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As Joel Garreau has argued, human beings are not merely the 
authors of technological change, but also its objects, to an 
extent barely imaginable in earlier times.52  The convergence of 
genetics, robotics, information technology, and nanotechnology 
(GRIN) has radically altered our sense of the possible in the 
realm of self-manipulation. 
Consider the potential for cosmetic psychopharmacology to 
dampen or reverse negative emotional states.53  On a purely 
individualist and hedonist account of well-being, we should 
welcome such a development—surely no more effective method 
of attaining subjective satisfaction could be designed.54  But if 
we share Martha Nussbaums’s account of emotions as 
judgments of value, a great deal may be lost.55  The technology 
                                                          
world and ourselves.  Technology can play a crucial role in revealing to us the 
partiality or error of our assumptions.  The telescope revealed the 
shortcomings of a geocentric worldview, occasioning all manner of responsive 
revisions in elite and popular thought.  Philosopher Charles Taylor would call 
such breakthroughs, and many of their social repercussions, “epistemic gains,” 
which permit us a clearer and better view of the world and ourselves. 
CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 17-18 (1995). 
 52. JOEL GARREAU, RADICAL EVOLUTION: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF 
ENHANCING OUR MINDS, OUR BODIES – AND WHAT IT MEANS TO BE HUMAN 
(2005). 
 53. See RONALD DWORKIN, ARTIFICIAL HAPPINESS: THE DARK SIDE OF THE 
NEW HAPPY CLASS 17 (2006) (“Since the mind sets limits on behavior, small 
changes in the mind may have serious social consequences.  When a man 
silences his misery through Artificial Happiness, he also silences his 
conscience.”).  See also MARY EBERSTADT, HOME-ALONE AMERICA: THE 
HIDDEN TOLL OF DAY CARE, BEHAVIORAL DRUGS, AND OTHER PARENT 
SUBSTITUTES 68 (2004) (“[A] great deal of what was yesterday judged normal 
behavior is now pathologized and stigmatized in unprecedented degree.”).  I 
focus on the term  “cosmetic” to distinguish between the therapeutic 
alleviation of abnormal states (such as depression), and the enhancement of 
emotion to the point of feeling “better than well.”  So  “cosmetic” is meant to 
designate, not the triviality or superficiality of the intervention, but rather, 
how different it is from classic methods of restoring health to a norm. 
 54. Wayne Sumner, a University of Toronto philosopher, has stated that 
“[t]ime and philosophical fashion have not been kind to hedonism . . . Although 
hedonistic theories of various sorts flourished for three centuries or so in the 
congenial empiricist habitat, they have all but disappeared from the scene.”  
Will Wilkinson,  In Pursuit of Happiness Research: Is It Reliable? What Does It 
Imply for Policy?, POLICY ANALYSIS, Apr. 11, 2007, at 1, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa590.pdf. 
 55. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE 
INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS (2001); Frank Pasquale, Two Concepts of 
Immortality: Reframing Public Debate on Stem-Cell Research, 14 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 73, 110 (2002) (“Ideally, we aim not merely to maximize our own 
pleasure, but to lead a balanced life of self-fulfillment and obligation to work, 
family, friends, and civil society.  When psychopharmacology helps us 
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may well have “extended human capacity,” but for what end? 
More importantly, will it diminish the possibility of our rightly 
discerning our ends? 
To bioethicist Carl Elliott, using drugs to alleviate mild 
alienation may lead to self-betrayal, since intuitions about the 
worth or worthlessness of forms of life around us are 
constitutive of our identity.56  Peter Kramer counters that 
current drugs do not dispatch such intuitions, but only relieve 
the negative affect they generate in those who hold them.57 
This response does not begin to address the potential social 
concerns raised by future technological interventions.  When 
designer drugs become focused not merely on the alleviation of 
depression, but on the destruction of all manner of negative 
mental states, their users may well become incapable of feeling 
the force of reasons that might once have led them to promote 
or accept the regulation of such drugs. 
The difficult question for regulators of various 
performance-enhancing neuropharmacological interventions is 
whether they have the potential to blunt users’ perceptions of 
the deep changes they wreak in users themselves.  Substance 
addiction has been modeled as a case of “increasing marginal 
utility,” in which the more one uses, the more one wants.  New 
neural performance enhancement addiction might work in a far 
subtler way—by blunting the appeal of alternate sources of 
value and satisfaction. 
The same competitive dynamics described above in the 
case of education, salience (in search results), and competence, 
may lead to the commodification of mood in the modern 
workplace.  Management consultants and career counselors 
value positivity, team players, and “people persons.”  Those 
who do not fit this increasingly Procrustean mold are less likely 
to be tolerated in the workforce when quick and easy 
                                                          
constructively connect to these realms, it is to be applauded.  To the extent 
that it enables us to endure or ignore disconnection, it is suspect.”). 
 56. Carl Elliott, Medicate Your Dissent, 
http://www.tc.umn.edu/~ellio023/medicate.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2006). 
 57. PETER KRAMER, LISTENING TO PROZAC (1993); PETER D. KRAMER, 
AGAINST DEPRESSION (2005) (making “an insistent argument that depression 
is a disease, one we would do well to oppose wholeheartedly.”); David 
DeGrazia, Prozac, Enhancement, and Self-Creation, 30 HASTINGS CTR. 
REPORT no. 2, at 35 (2000) (arguing that new psychotropic drugs promote 
autonomy by widening the range of projects one can conceivably take on). 
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pharmaceutical interventions could “cure” them.58  As Nikolas 
Rose notes, new techniques of self-manipulation create ever 
more pressure toward responsibilization, in which individuals 
are held responsible for aspects of the self that in the past were 
not deemed under their control.59  Today, parents who “insist” 
on having children with Down’s Syndrome are greeted with 
increasing incomprehension; perhaps tomorrow will see 
increasing intolerance of any mood profiles that fail to conduce 
to maximum productivity. 
CONCLUSION 
The great techno-skeptics Jacques Ellul and Langdon 
Winner have argued that technological change has its own 
logic, bending to its ends the legal structures originally 
designed to constrain it.60  Ellul’s writing style is often opaque, 
and it is not clear how technology has the agency necessary to 
create the effects he describes.61 In this brief essay, I have 
attempted to fill this causal aporia by tracing interrelationships 
                                                          
 58. Compare Lindsey A. Vacco, Comment, Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis: From Preventing Genetic Disease to Customizing Children. Can the 
Technology be Regulated Based on the Parents’ Intent?, 49 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1181 
(2005), with William Saletan, Better than Sex: The growing practice of embryo 
eugenics, SLATE, Sept. 16, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2149772/ (“P.G.D. 
prevents hellish diseases. In those cases, you have to say yes. And once you 
start saying yes, it’s hard to say no. That’s why they call it a slippery slope.”).  
In the case of preimplantation genetic diagnosis, many worry that society will 
become less tolerant of those disabled by conditions that their parents could 
have selected against either before or at an early stage of pregnancy.  In the 
case of mood-alteration, those with difficult or just shy personalities may not 
be tolerated as well in the future as society begins to expect such individuals 
to take drugs to “cure” their diffidence.  Of course, we should welcome 
interventions that curb genuinely abusive behavior.  See, e.g., ROBERT I. 
SUTTON, THE NO ASSHOLE RULE: BUILDING A CIVILIZED WORKPLACE AND 
SURVIVING ONE THAT ISN’T (2007) (best-selling business book arguing for “zero 
tolerance” of cruelty in the workplace). 
 59. See NIKOLAS ROSE, THE POLITICS OF LIFE ITSELF: BIOMEDICINE, 
POWER, AND SUBJECTIVITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 134 (2007). 
 60. See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1964); LANGDON 
WINNER, AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY: TECHNICS-OUT-OF-CONTROL AS A 
THEME IN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1977) 
 61. For a definition of agency, see CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS VOL. I: HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 15-16 (“What is it that we 
attribute to ourselves as human agents which we would not attribute to 
animals? . . . [W]hat is distinctively human is the power to evaluate our 
desires, to regard some as desirable and others as undesirable.”).  Given this 
sense of the nature of agency and free will, it is difficult to understand how 
technology can possess it. 
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among technology, competition, commodification, and values in 
an array of human endeavors. 
Technology in itself cannot force individuals to do 
anything.  However, structures of competition and inequality 
can raise the price of failure to adopt technology such that 
acquiescence is all but inevitable.62  Moreover, as technology 
promises to cure the stress and anxiety attendant on 
recognition of such realties, it may lull us into an acceptance of 
“realities” that our better selves would abjure.  Theories of law 
and technology must address these situations in the future. 
 
                                                          
 62. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987). 
